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Bills and Notes-Executors and Administrators-Personal
Liability on Notes for Benefit of Estate.
An administrator executed a note for premiums on a fire insur-
ance policy covering property belonging to the estate. His signature
was followed by the expression "administrator of" the estate. In a
suit by the insurance company on the note, the maker was held per-
sonally liable.1
Administrators, executors, and trustees2 are generally held per-
sonally liable on notes which they sign, even though they append to
their signatures such expressions as "trustee," "executor of X," "ad-
ministrator of X estate."3  These expressions are regarded by most
courts as mere descriptiones personaum, and not as an indication of
status.4 The fiduciary is considered not as an agent but as a prin-
cipal.5 One reason for this is that common-law courts, during
'Home Ins. Co. v. Parks, 156 S. E. 471 (Ga. 1931).
' This note will not deal with the execution of notes by agents. For a
treatment of that subject, see 1 Mxc xm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §1121 et seq.;
Note (1923) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 49.
'Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606, 91 Pac. 518 (1907) (note by "A, trustee");
Harrison v. McClelland, 57 Ga. 531 (1876) (note by administratrix); Ritten-
house v. Ammerman, 64 Mo. 197, 27 Am. Rep. 215 (1876) (note by executor
for expense connected with trust) ; Morehead Banking Co. v. Morehead et aL,
116 N. C. 410, 21 S. E. 190 (1895) (note by executrix); Roger Williams
National Bank v. Groton Mfg. Co. et al., 16 R. 1. 504, 17 Atl. 170 (1889)
(note signed "A, B, C, trustees estate of D") ; East Tenn. Iron Mfg. Co. v.
Gaskell et al., 70 Tenn. 742 (1879) (note by executors); NORTON, BILus Awn
NorsS (4th ed. 1914) §33. As to individual liability on bond given by admin-
istrator, see McLean v. McLean, 88 N. C. 395 (1882).
'Stubbs v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Macon, 12 Ga. App. 539, 77 S. E. 893
(1913) (note signed "A administrator of estate of B") ; Nolin v. Mooty, 29
Ga. App. 97, 113 S. E. 814 (1922) (transfer of note by administratrix) ; Note
(1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 397. For a judicial criticism of the general doctrine
of descriptio personae, see Saul et al. v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co., 6
Ga. App. 843, 65 S. E. 1065, 1067 (1909).
'Hall v. Jameson, supra note 3. The rule is thus stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Taylor v. Mayo, 110 U. S. 330, 4 Sup. Ct. 147, 28
L. ed. 163 (1884) :
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the years in which they were distinct from courts of equity, could not
take notice of the trust relationship. Creditors desiring to reach the
assets of the fiduciary estate were therefore, except in a few juris-
dictions, 6 limited to an equity of subrogation, dependent upon the
responsibility of the fiduciary as an individual and upon the state of
accounts between him and the estate. 7
Although, in the absence of court order or authority in the instru-
ment creating the trust, a fiduciary may not mortgage or pledge trust
assets, even to secure a legitimate trust debt,8 he may absolve himself
from personal liability by appropriate express language in the instru-
ment, e.g., "as trustee, but not individually," or "as trustee, but not
otherwise." 9 Section 20 of the N. I. L.10 has been construed to re-
lieve the fiduciary from personal liability if he signed in a represent-
ative capacity and was duly authorized."1 If the fiduciary exercises
"When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound, no one is bound, for
he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise. The contract is there-
fore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee holds the estate,
although only with the power and for the purpose of managing it, he is per-
sonally bound by contracts he makes as trustee, even when designating himself
as such."
'BoGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 303-304.
" Norton v. Phelps, 54 Miss. 467 (1877) (supplies and money advanced for
trust estate; trustee became non-resident); Mitchell v. Whitlock, 121 N. C.
166, 28 S. E. 292 (1897) (action for goods sold and delivered to trustee);
Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts (1915) 28 HAM.
L. REv. 725.
'Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191 N. C. 769, 133 S. E. 93 (1926) (power of
trustees of.charitable trust to mortgage not sanctioned by language of deed of
trust) ; Tuttle v. First Nat. Bank of Greenfield, 187 Mass. 533, 73 N. E. 560
(1905) (denying right of trustee to pledge in absence of authority) ; BoGERT,
op. cit. supra note 6, 305-314.
,Thayer v. Wendell, I Gall. (Fed.) 37, Fed. Cas. 13,873 (1812) (covenant
by executor, in his capacity as such, but "not otherwise"); Shoe & Leather
Nat. Bank v. Dix et al., 123 Mass. 148, 25 Am. Rep. 49 (1877) (note beginning
"We, as trustees but not individually, promise," etc., and signed "A, B, C, trus-
tees"); Morehead Banking Co. v. Morehead et al., 116 N. C. 413, 21 S. E. 191
(1895) (note containing phrase "A, executrix of B, but not personally"; not
to be confused with case between same parties cited supra note 3). As to effect
given covenant of trustee when read in connection with deed of trust and order
of court having jurisdiction over the trust property, see Glenn v. Allison, 58
Md. 527 (1882) ; as to power of trustee to create charge against trust estate
equivalent to his own lien for reimbursement, in favor of another by whom
services are rendered, see Jessup v. Smith ef al., 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403
(1918).
" "Where the instrument contains, or a person adds to his signature, words
indicating that he signs for and on behalf of a principal or in a representative
capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the
mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a represent-
ative capacity, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from
personal liability." N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3001.
Gutelius v. Stanbon et al., 39 F. (2d) 621 (D. Mass. 1930) (note by trus-
tees of realty trust) ; Charles Nelson Co. v. Morton et al., 288 Pac. 845 (Cal.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
this privilege of exoneration, the creditor may subject the trust estate
to his claim by a suit in equity; and "to give the creditor a right
against the estate it is necessary only that the trustee acted properly
in incurring the debt."' 2 The so-called Massachusetts business trust
accomplishes the immunization of the trustees and beneficiaries from
personal liability, and gives direct access to the trust assets, by put-
ting creditors on notice of provisions in the trust instrument.:3
The general rule illustrated by the principal case might well yield
today to a working presumption that when signatures of fiduciaries
are thus affixed to bona fide contracts, the intent is the same as when
the more amplified wording is inserted.
WLiAM J. ADAMs, JR.
Contracts-Liability of Father Under Later Promise for
Son's Purchase on Sunday.
Automobile tires were furnished on Sunday to the minor son of
the defendant. There was evidence that the father thereafter, on a
secular day, promised to pay for the tires, and that he retained and
used them. Held, even though the original contract be treated as
illegal and void, continued use furnished consideration for the sub-
sequent promise, and it was error to grant a nonsuit.'
On the question presented by this case there is practically an equal
division of authority, a slight majority favoring the result of the
decision.2 The cases allowing recovery may be divided into four
1930) (note by trustees) ; First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Jacobs, 85 W. Va. 653,
102 S. E. 491 (1920) (note by executrix) ; see American Trust Co. v. Canevin,
184 Fed. 657, 661, 663 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); 1 WhI.isToN, CoNTRACTS (1920)
§§311, 312. But such a construction of the section does not seem to be quite
logical in view of the fact that a fiduciary has no principal. And it is said in
BRANNAN, NEGoTiuBL INsTRr mMsTs LAW, ANNOTATD (4th ed. 1926) at 176:
"Section 20 does not protect him (the trustee or executor) for the estate is
not a principal and he is not its agent." The courts that uphold the applicabil-
ity of the section to fiduciaries seem to do so on the ground that such a con-
struction gives effect to the intention of the parties and is expedient from a
business standpoint.
" Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, at 739, 740. As to the effect of authorization
by, the will on the power of executor to charge estate, see dicta in Harris v.
Woodard, 133 Ga. 104, 65 S. E. 250, 252 (1909) and in Brown v. Fairhall, 213
Mass. 290, 100 N. E. 556, 557 (1913) ; NO RTON, op. cit. supra note 3; 91, n. 78.
' Roberts v. Aberdeen-Southern Pines Syndicate et al., 198 N. C. 381, 151
S. E. 865 (1930) ; Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1103.
Smith Motor Car Co. v. Goddard, 156 S. E. 724 (Ga, App. 1931).
'Rosenbloom v. Schachner, 84 N. J. L. 525, 87 AtI. 99 (1913); Banks v.
Werts, 13 Ind. 203 (1859); Williamson v. Brandenberg, 6 Ind. App. 97, 32
N. E. 1022 (1893). Contra: Troewert v. Decker, 57 Wis. 46, 8 N. W. 26
(1881) ; Ladd v. Rogers, 93 Mass. 209 (1865) ; Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1487.
